included or excluded. The definitional issue is, therefore, to a large extent just that: a question of labels, not of substance.
A more substantive criticism raised by Van der Brug and Fennema, however, concerns what they see as our one-sided emphasis on supply-side variables-discursive opportunity structures and the availability of political space-to the neglect of demandside variables. Contrary to what Van der Brug and Fennema claim, we do however, neither implicitly nor explicitly assume that demand-side variables are constant across countries. In fact, we consistently contrast our predictions derived from a political opportunity model with those that follow from an emphasis on demand-side factors such as the level of unemployment, the rate of immigration, and the size of the foreign population. As we show on page , these variables are not constant across the five countries included in our analysis-Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. However, we show that the cross-national variation on these variables does not fit the cross-national variation on the dependent variables of interest: the electoral strength of extreme right parties (p. ), the strength of extreme-right claims making in public discourse (pp. -), and the share of violence in the action repertoire of the extreme right (p. ). All these aspects of extreme right mobilization are much better explained by cross-national variation in discursive opportunities and political space. In fact, our findings here almost perfectly match those of Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie (), which the authors mention towards the end of their review article. In that paper, they also show that unemployment, inflation, and immigration rates do not provide good explanations for cross-national variation and that opportunity structure variables-including a measure of political space in the form of the left/right position of the most important 'mainstream' competitor provide a much better explanation ( percent explained variance). The quibble seems to be about the effects that they find for two measures of the ideological proximity of voters to extreme right parties, which are rather small ( percent additional explained variance), and of which it is moreover questionable whether they are truly independent variables, or rather aspects of what needs to be explained.
Van der Burg and Fennema see another weakness of our work in 'the fact that radical right claims making [. . .] is subdivided in radical right violent and unconventional mobilization on the one hand and electoral success of radical right parties on the other.' They argue that these two dependent variables create confusion in our model. We contend, however, that it is the failure to make this distinction that creates confusion in much of the literature on the extreme right, which either studies the electoral fortunes of parties without seeing them as part of a broader extreme-right movement, or studies extra-parliamentary mobilization, and particularly xenophobic violence, without paying attention to its interrelation with extreme-right political parties. Only because we make this distinction between party mobilization and xenophobic violence, are we able to arrive at one of our most interesting findings, namely the inverse relationship between extremeright party strength and the level of xenophobic violence. The strength of the social movement perspective that we take on the extreme right is precisely to view mobilization  Note that the authors themselves do not succeed in delineating the parties of interest just on the basis of their anti-immigrant stance, but differentiate them from 'mainstream' parties that advocate anti-immigrant positions in just the same way as we do by referring to them as 'non-established.' F O R U M   through parties as one strategic option in a wider repertoire of possibilities that extreme-right groups have. From our theoretical approach, it follows that the moderate repertoire of working through electoral channels of representation will be followed where political opportunities are favorable, i.e., where extreme-right demands resonate with dominant political discourses on citizenship and national identity, and where mainstream parties leave relatively much political space to extreme-right challengers. However, where such institutional opportunities are unfavorable, the expectation is that extreme-right groups will choose more radical action forms, including violence. In other words, we predict that extreme-right party strength and xenophobic violence will be inversely related, and this is indeed what we empirically find. In the light of the documented findings for other types of movements, this finding is not so surprising. Analyses of the New Left movements of the s and s and the new social movements of the s have documented that radicalization of these movements, including left-wing terrorism, was most prevalent in countries where these movements had been least successful in entering mainstream politics through new left-libertarian and green parties, or through co-optation into existing social-democratic and communist parties (e.g. Della Porta, ; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendaak, & Giugni,) . While this finding is well-established for left-wing movements, the common wisdom on the extreme right still seems to be that strong and successful extreme-right parties provide fertile soil for violent extra-parliamentary extreme-right groups. Our findings show that in spite of the ideological differences between right-wing and left-wing movements, they follow the same basic logic. In both cases, the inverse relationship between institutionalization and violence is likely to be produced by a combination of factors. First, it is a question of tactical choice, in which activists will prefer less costly and risky, moderate and institutional forms of mobilization where such forms are successful. Second, strong parties provide an alternative political career path for radicals who might otherwise have been engaging in violence, but who can now become party activists. Third, parties may exert an active moderating pressure on activists, because they have an interest in not spoiling their electoral chances by becoming associated to violence. There is no theoretical reason to assume that these mechanisms do not apply in the case of right-wing movements, and our analyses in Contested Citizenship show that there is no empirical basis for this assumption either. We believe, therefore, that rather than being confusing, our distinction between party mobilization on the one hand, and violent and unconventional mobilization on the other, throws light on important issues that would otherwise have remained obscure. 
